Fordham University

Fordham Research Commons
Research Resources

Hermeneutic and Phenomenological
Philosophies of Science

2000

The Gay Science
David B. Allison

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.library.fordham.edu/phil_research
Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Allison, David B., "The Gay Science" (2000). Research Resources. 54.
https://research.library.fordham.edu/phil_research/54

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Hermeneutic and Phenomenological
Philosophies of Science at Fordham Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research
Resources by an authorized administrator of Fordham Research Commons. For more information, please contact
considine@fordham.edu, bkilee@fordham.edu.

From: David Blair Allison, Reading the New Nietzsche
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000)

T H E G AY S C I E N C E

Of all of Nietzsche's texts, The Gay Science (or Joyful Wisdom [Die frohliche
Wissenschaft]) is probably his most important. Nietzsche not only came to
think of it in later years as his most congenial and personal work, but he often
referred to it as his "most medial book," the one that stood at the midpoint of
his life and served as a fulcrum for his subsequent thought. Indeed, shortly
after completing the first edition in 1882 (an additional chapter would be added
in 1887, together with a preface and an appendix of poems), Nietzsche stressed
the crucial importance of the work in a letter to Franz Overbeck, perhaps his
closest friend at the time:
If you have read the "Sanctus Januarius" [i.e., book

4), you will have remarked

that I have crossed a tropic. Everything that lies before me is new, and it will not
be long before I catch sight also of the terrifying face of my more distant life
task. . . . This whole interim state between what was and what will be, I call "in
media vita."1

"In media vita" (in midlife) is the title of a section near the end of book 4,
and the "interim state" it implies aptly described the author's own frame of
mind. Furthermore, the section indicates how Nietzsche came to achieve this
state, and in its exuberance, it echoes the tone of the book and reproduces the
entire range of the book's subject matter:
In Media Vita.-No!

Life has not disappointed me! On the contrary, I find it

truer, more desirable and mysterious every year---ever since the day when the
great liberator came to me: the idea that life could be an experiment of the seeker
for knowledge-and not a duty, not a calamity, not trickery.-And knowledge
itself: let it be something else for others; for example, a bed to rest on, or the way
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to such a bed, or a diversion, or a form of leisure-for me it is a world of dangers
and victories in which heroic feelings, too, find places to dance and play.

a means to knowledge"-with

"Life as

this principle in one's heart, one can live not only

boldly but even gaily, and laugh gaily, too.2

For Nietzsche, this medial book was both intensely personal and all-perva
sive in its import: personal, since Nietzsche claimed that, through having writ
ten it, he was able to formulate the means for his own liberation, that is, to
devise a "Gay Science," or "Joyful Wisdom."3 The text was all-pervasive in the
import of its subject matter, since his liberation was a direct response to what
he discussed throughout the book as the greatest single event in world history,
the event that inaugurated modernity itself: the "death of God." Thus moved,
Nietzsche recognized that the life of the individual could no longer be believed,
bound by, or even be understood in terms of the demands of an absolute moral
order, one that had its basis in the authority of a transcendent God. Since it
was through the authority of just such a transcendent, divine order that the
human world was traditionally thought to have any meaning or value at all
that existence itself was believed to have a purpose or destiny-the passing
away of that divine authority would, as Nietzsche suggested, be "terrifying"
indeed. In fact, the death of God would itself bring about an "interim state"
par excellence-the point between a comprehensible moral world order and
something else: perhaps, a world of unexampled chaos and nihilism. What re
mained in the balance and what the middle position thus implied, therefore,
far outweighed any consideration of one individual's personal disposition.
Rather, what was announced by the death of God-and Nietzsche hardly hesi
tated to dramatize this (e.g., in section 125)-was an irrevocable age in human
history, one to be measured in eons. "It is not inconceivable that I am the first
philosopher of the age, perhaps even a little more, something decisive and
doom-laden standing between two millennia."4
One could easily say that the main concern of The Gay Science is precisely
to understand and to address the problem of the "between": to focus on the
medial state, to question the position and significance of human existence
within an age that no longer seemed to have a discernible center. Thus, by
emphasizing the all-too-apparent loss of this center (i.e., what traditionally
served as a supreme-and divinely sanctioned-source of meaning, value, and
purpose), Nietzsche commenced his task of establishing a "joyful wisdom." He
claimed to do this by investing human existence with the active desire to desire
itself, to serve itself in its own name-to joyfully legislate its own human values,
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vocations, and ends. With this in view, Nietzsche set out to formulate a pro
posal for an entirely immanent human future, one he conceived under the
enigmatic title "the eternal recurrence. " The medial state of

The Gay Science

thus unfolded, as he pointed out in his letter to Overbeck, from what was to
what would be: from his initial analysis of the so-called "purposive existence"
to his concluding remarks on the doctrine of eternal recurrence.
Five years would separate the publication of the last section of

Science, book 5, from the earlier chapters.

The Gay

During the intervening years, Nietz

sche continued to explore the consequences of the "death of God" and his
conception of the "eternal return"-most notably, in the dramatic prose of

Thus Spoke Zarathustra ( 1883-85). In the following work of 1886, Beyond
Good and Evil, he would draw upon the methodological insights he achieved
in The Gay Science to further examine the deeper origins and underlying moti
vations-psychological, cultural, social, philosophical-that found expression
in the traditional metaphysical worldview, together with its accompanying
moral system. He would explicitly focus on the origins and dynamics of moral
ity as the main concern of his next work,

On the Genealogy of Morals, in 1887.

Nonetheless, he had already raised these closely intertwined issues, at the very
beginning of book

1

in

The Gay Science-section 1,

"The Teachers of the

Purpose of Existence. "
The first five sections i n book 5 strongly reassert the major themes o f the
earlier chapters, and they point to his growing concern \vith how the deeply
rooted, traditional religious values serve to limit the individual's freedom and
autonomy and to weaken, if not destroy, the individual's sense of self-worth. In
such circumstances, all of human pain and suffering is interpreted in religious
terms, under the form of sin and guilt, and this burden results in even more
suffering for the individual: it creates an impossible situation of humiliation
and shame, a state of impoverished despair-wherein the individual comes to
despise himself and is driven to exact revenge upon the very conditions of
human existence as psychological compensation for this suffering.5 By the time
Nietzsche completed book 5 and the introduction to the second edition, he
would address this complex problem of suffering, guilt, and shame-he consid
ered it a pathology-analyzing the means by which it is induced, as well as
perpetuated. He would then go on to propose how it could be overcome:
through the cultivation of a critical awareness, through a sense of generosity
and self-respect, and by learning how to become well-disposed to oneself.
Looking back on

The Gay Science in 1888 in the brief section devoted to it in
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Ecce Horrw, he would point to the "granite words in which a destiny finds for
the first time a formula for itself"6 in the last three aphorisms of book 3:
Whom do you call bad?-Those who always want t o put t o shame.
What do you consider most humane?-To spare someone shame.
What is the seal of liberation?-No longer being ashamed in front of oneself.
This would correspond, at least in part, to what Nietzsche wrote to Heinrich
von Stein, concerning "what I have never yet revealed to anyone-the task
which confronts me, my life's task": namely, that "I would like to take away
from human existence some of its heartbreaking and cruel character."7
Oddly, there is no mention of the "eternal return" in book 5 nor in the
introduction. When Nietzsche developed this theme at length in 'Zarathustra,
he cast it under the aura of a myth, hoping to find in the resources of myth an
antidote to the metaphysical doctrines of religious belief. While such an ap
proach served him well in The Birth of Tragedy, it seems Nietzsche felt these
resources-myth, music, drama, and so forth-had become by now inappropri
ate and inadequate to the task.

STYLISTIC CONCERNS IN N I ETZSCHE'S WORKS

It is hardly an overstatement to say that Nietzsche writes with a certain
extravagance of style, even with hyperbole and excess-or, as he says, "in
blood. " His thought issues forth in what seems to be almost an abandonment
of conventional philosophical form and constraint. That the style of the book
was meant to be poetic in nature is indicated by its very subtitle, "La Caya
Scienza," which refers to the tradition of chivalric poetry of the French Proven9al courts, dating back to the early Middle Ages. Indeed, Nietzsche's style of
composition is profuse in the variety of expressive and rhetorical techniques it
draws upon, and this tends to render his thought extremely resistant to system
atic elaboration, even by his most generous reader. As he would say in 'Zara
thustra, "It is not easily possible to understand the blood of another."8
To begin to examine this unsystematic character of expression and the diffi
culties this entails for understanding, much less interpreting, the text of The
Gay Science, the reader must first attend to Nietzsche's peculiar style of
thought and to his complex style of writing. While Nietzsche often claimed
many literary and philosophical antecedents, it is arguable whether one could
find a stronger single example of a thinker from the Western tradition whose
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distinctive style of expression so forcefully reflects the content of his concerns.
What he says and how he says it are so much the same: both his own style and
the world he writes about confront us as a dynamic play of multiple and contin
ually changing appearances. It is precisely this dynamic play of successively
experienced events, a world understood as the active insurgence of all process
and change, that he would later term "the will to power." He conceives this to
be the expression-the self-articulation-of all force, energy, life : of nature
itself as a dynamic process of teeming and recurrent metamorphosis.9 To see
the confluence of Nietzsche's style and the content it so forcefully expresses,
we look at paragraph

310, where

he explicitly addresses this dynamic "will to

power." The image or metaphor he uses to describe it is the
does he explicitly identify

himself with

wave.

Not only

the wave, with its surging foam and

thunder, its infinite capacity to transform itself and to recur, once again, bear
ing its emerald crest of elemental nature, but he also

writes

in waves

investing a rhythmic and pulsatile flow to the very composition of his prose.
Read, or better still, speak aloud, the following passage:
How greedily this wave approaches . . . but already another wave is approaching,
still more greedily and savagely than the first, and its soul, too, seems to be full
of secrets and the lust to dig up treasures. Thus live waves-thus live we who
will . . . . Carry on as you like, roaring with overweening plt'.asure and malice---0r
dive again, pouring your emeralds down into the deepest depths, and throw your
infinite white mane of foam and spray over them: everything suits me, for every
thing suits you so well, and I am so well-disposed toward you for everything; how
could I think of betraying you? For-mark my word!-I know you and your
secret, I know your kind! You and I-are we not of one kind? You and I--do we
not have one secret?10

The vibrant expressiveness of Nietzsche's prose, the fertility and suggestive
ness of its content, refuse to be systematized; it resists the imposition of static
categories, of rule governance-whether logical or linguistic. The dynamic flow
of the experienced events he evokes cannot be easily articulated: it bears no
simple definition, it claims no essence or distinctive form. In this respect,
Nietzsche's discourse declines reliance upon strict definition, upon the single,
unchanging, univocal meaning of a term, upon the rigorous logical argument,
and most forcefully, upon the principle of identity, which certifies that one
thing is only one thing-and nothing else. Nietzsche turns away from all this,
on the level of style, toward the more poetic, figurative use of language: the
aphorism, the apothegm, the image, the simile, the metaphor, all of which
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are essentially unstable, imbalanced means of expression. For the predominant
tradition of Western thought, these figures of language have been rigorously set
apart from philosophic expression proper, figurative (i.e., nonliteral) language
having been deemed imprecise, and worthy only for "art" or rhetorical "distor
tion," for the "impure" domain of poetic obscurity, confusion, and nonsense.
Nietzsche's use of the aphorism or apothegm is fully crucial to his dynamic
engagement of style and content of thought and the world it bespeaks. In fact,
it is surely one of his most distinctive features of expression.11 The aphorism
the short, terse, witty, and incisive remark that expresses a far wider truth than
the strict meaning of the terms it employs-is itself alive, animate: that is to
say, open-ended in its possible significance. It responds to the genius and inspi
ration of a critical mind, an inquisitive reader, but it resists formalism and
catechism . In this regard, it is a "tum" or "trope" of phrase and thought, a

movement of expression,

that by means of its distinctive agency, directs us be

yond a fixed idea, beyond a simple corresponding meaning or referent in a
static system of rules or definitions. The aphorism destroys the possibility of
such a fixed, literal system because it is essentially incomplete in its significance.
It demands that an interpretive operation be performed upon it by the reader
for its very intelligibility. The aphorism demands that the reader give it mean
ing, for it does not possess a single, discrete meaning in

itself

You, the reader,

are immediately involved, enamored, intertwined with the aphorism, with the
proverb or parable. You invest it with meaning by

interpreting it,

by inserting

it into ever-new contexts, by directing its words to ever-new occasions, associa
tions, events-and what follows? The aphorism itself changes, it assumes a
new reference, situation, context, appropriateness, valence-and hence, a new
meaning. This dynamic property of expressiveness renders the aphorism essen
tially

metaphorical:

as such, it induces the reader to gather resemblances, to

cull differences, to collect similarities, to compare and contrast markedly dif
ferent cases, and to assemble all these, however briefly, and to thereby exhibit,
to make manifest, the very movement of thought. In this sense, the metaphor
is an instrument for thinking and not an end-point or terminus of thought. The
term metaphor itself comes from the Greek meta-pherein, to carry or to trans
port across a distance. So understood, the metaphor is neither static nor com
plete. Rather, it brings together scattered semantic elements of meaning in a
movement of thought, in a shifting process of displacement and transference. 12
Active, incomplete, manifold, and alive, the metaphor not only characterizes
a movement of thought, it also stands as an analogy, or an analogue, for what
exists. The very structure of the metaphor serves as an analogical expression
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for the dynamic flow of appearances themselves, for the constant motion, mu
tation, and change of objects, events, situations-what we earlier saw Nietzsche
come to call "the will to power." For Nietzsche, the metaphor enjoys a very
real privilege, in fact the metaphor serves to structure cognitive and semantic
processes and at the same time it is the most apt means of expressing reality
itself. How we think, therefore, is basically understood by Nietzsche to be a
metaphorical process. The meanings of those things we in fact experience or
think about likewise result from these metaphorical processes. Finally, the fact
that the world itself is mobile, dynamic, fluid, changeable-understood as shift
ing arrangements, as constellations, or as factored groupings of force or en
ergy---demands

a

dynamically

conceived

means

of

expression,

of

representation, of language, to adequately portray it. For Nietzsche, the meta
phor is the most appropriate means.
With this admission, however, we come to a most crucial point for under
standing Nietzsche. According to his account, the

real is no longer what tradi

tion formerly held it to be. That is, Nietzsche no longer conceives reality
according to the model of a stable, essentially static, or even law-governed,
order. Nor does he claim that the real is itself rational or logical, much less that
the natural order is reasonable or purposive. For Nietzsche, there is no endur
ing, fixed, absolutely stable form of reality either outside ourselves, in the
world, outside our own thought, or even within the confines of our thought.
Neither is there a stabilizing logic to reality itself, nor is there an absolutely
governing form of reason naturally inherent or ingredient in our own thought
that would strictly conform to the real.
Approaching Nietzsche's texts-especially those written after

Tragedy

The Birth of

we seem to encounter a dramatically new frame of reference. Here

-

is indeed a world, but one of "appearances" only, of insubstantial pulsions of
energy, or what Nietzsche often terms "will"-again, in the sense of "force"-a
perplexingly chaotic state that seems to reflect the anarchic world of the pre
Olympian gods-before creation-a state of primordial strife, warfare, and
force, whose only reality is the dynamics of its appearance, of its perpetual
conflict and mutation. The world is as it presents itself to us: motile, dynamic,
in flux, in constant metamorphosis and change.
Against this newly conceived, dynamic frame of reference, the stable notions
of logic itself seem weak and inadequate. Nietzsche, for example, denies the
heretofore unquestioned authority of the very first principle of logic, that is,
the simple principle of identity that A is

A.

For the employment of language or

thought, therefore, Nietzsche's account charges that there is no strictly identi-
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cal word, thought, or meaning-that strict self-identity could never, in princi
ple or in fact, occur to human experience. 13 Words, terms, meanings,
propositions, and concepts, for Nietzsche, are generalized constructs of human
invention-they merely serve as momentarily agreed-upon fabrications, as the
conventional fictions of a given culture and its language. In no way are they
taken to be simple, single, and unchanging definitions, forms, or essences. In
the absence of a strict sense of logical identity, the subsequent issue of contra
diction fails to arise, since there is, literally, nothing to contradict. For Nietz
sche, then, logical contradiction itself gives way to frenzy, identity to chaos. As
he would say in his essay of 1873, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense":
Every word immediately becomes a concept inasmuch as it is

not intended to

serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly individualized original experience
to which it owes its birth, but must at the same time fit innumerable, nwre or
less similar cases-which means, strictly speaking, never equal-in other words,
a lot of unequal cases. Every concept originates through our equating what is
unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept "leaf" is formed
through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through for
getting the distinctions . . . . What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms-in short, a sum of human relations, which
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and
which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are
illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors
which are worn out and without sensuous power . . . to be truthful means using
the customary metaphors-in moral terms: the obligation to lie according to a
fixed convention, to lie herd-like in a style obligatory for all. 1 4

Given this warning as to the impossibility of precise logical expressiveness
and the impossibility of any strictly truthful content, Nietzsche nonetheless
goes on to write some sixteen major works. Precisely for whom, though, is
not immediately evident. Nonetheless, that he does seem to have a particular
audience in mind is strongly suggested by his employment of a stylistic device
well known to the philosophic and rhetorical tradition: namely, the use of what
is often termed "hidden" or "concealed" writing. According to the concerns of
such a tradition, an author, for a variety of reasons, may choose to employ some
stylistic element of indirection, of silence, of a low-profile sort of encoding a
message, which provides certain "clues" or gives a certain nonapparent "consis
tency" to the text that would enable sympathetic readers to properly grasp his
message. While what the author intends to say to his own select audience is
thereby "concealed" or "hidden" to a more general, and perhaps unsympa-
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thetic, audience, the latter will grasp the text on a surface or manifest level,
which to all general appearances, is simply a straightforward exposition or nar
rative. The author quite literally presents two faces of himself, each of which
answers to a specific objective and is addressed to a different audience. The
objectives and different audiences, in tum, warrant the author's use of different
stylistic strategies and tactics, such that he might ensure the effective conceal
ment of one message (i.e., the restriction of what is important and what must
be said to those who can understand it), to conceal that important message
from the other, inappropriate, audience.
Why an author should choose to compose his text in such a fashion is, of
course, an extremely complex issue. The author may be subject to popular
disapproval or persecution for his views. He may wish not to upset or to need
lessly offend an otherwise well-disposed general public. He may wish not to
provoke public opinion over issues he considers to be important, but which are
necessarily restricted to a particular, selected audience of like-minded readers,
of sympathizers and intellectual collaborators, whose identity might be better
kept secret, or discretely hidden from view. 15 Alternatively, the author may well
wish to provoke a negative or emotional response in the wider audience, pre
cisely to deter those individuals from examining his text too closely, and thus,
to prevent them from being unduly influenced, and perhaps harmed, by his
text. Stylistic and rhetorical excess, in this case, can well serve a prophylactic
function. In some cases, then, the author may well wish to close the reader's
ears beforehand, precisely in deference to their own best interests. 16 Nietzsche
discusses this distinction of audience in section 381 of The Gay

Science,

the

section entitled "On the Question of Being Understandable":
One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just
surely

not to be

as

understood. It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a

book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the
author's intention-he did not want to be understood by just "anybody. " All the
nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate;
and choosing that, one at the same time erects barriers against "the others." All
the more subtle laws of any style have their origin at this point: they at the same
time keep away, create a distance, forbid "entrance," understanding, as said
above-while they open the ears of those whose ears are related to ours. 1 7

Elsewhere, in a letter to one of his friends, Malwida von Meysenbug, 1 8
Nietzsche elaborates this distinction of audience and shows how he will use
certain parts of the text (e.g., the preface) to communicate different messages
and to provoke different responses, accordingly:
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The long prefaces which I have found necessary for the new edition of my com
plete works tell with a ruthless honesty some curious things about myself. With
these I'll ward off "the many" once and for all. . . . I've thrown out my hook to
"the few" instead, and even with them I'm prepared to be patient. For my ideas
are so indescribably strange and dangerous that only much later (surely not be
fore

1901) will anybody be ready for them. 19

The Gay Science, paragraph 381, Nietzsche offers
as to why, at least in the case of the present work, he chose

Finally, and again from
us an explanation

to maintain this clear distinction of audience:
Being an immoralist, one has to take steps against corrupting innocents-I mean,
asses and old maids of both sexes whom life offers nothing but their innocence.
Even more, my writings should inspire, elevate, and encourage them to be virtu
ous. I cannot imagine anything on earth that would be a merrier sight than in
spired old asses and maids.

Even granting the distinction of audience-and the correlative observation
that a text may be understood in quite different ways, that one text may sustain
markedly different interpretations and, thus, markedly different meanings
once we commence reading such a work as

The Gay Science, particularly when

we read what Nietzsche has to say about the subject of ethics and morality, we
are struck by the excess, th e hype rbole, and the evocative force of his pro

nouncements. What, one is tempted to ask, could conceivably account for the
apparent extremism of his views? How does one plausibly accept, for example,
his assertions that Eastern religion dwells on rice and indolence? Or, that the
founding fathers, the Patristic saints, of the Christian church are "holy epilep
tics"? That Judeo-Christian values are merely "slave values," that they foster a
"slave mentality"? That what is important to a statement of knowledge or belief
is not so much its "truth" but, rather, that it is a "coherent" pattern of lies?
That the German spirit has been ruined by a diet composed entirely of beer,
newspapers, and Wagnerian music? That human pride and national patriotism
are but simple forms of obstinacy and ignorance?
These seemingly intemperate remarks are not just random assertions, scat
tered and ill-humored passing observations, however. We have already sug
gested how the reader might better view the style and purpose of Nietzsche;
that is, he must be read properly, the mechanics of the metaphor and aphorism
must always be kept in mind and taken seriously. A properly responsive
thought, then, must be alive and attentive to the nuances and provocations of
his style. This is done, at least in part, by being impatient, by refusing to stop
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with a simple definition, some fixed term or meaning, or with a purportedly
"complete" explanation; by never ceasing to be incited by the ruse or play of
the text, by its emotionally charged solicitation of the reader, even if at first
sight this appeal seems unusual or excessive or dramatically exaggerated. All
these considerations point to the fact that Nietzsche writes to the heart as well
as to the mind. He wants to draw upon all the resources through which we
come to understand, value, and feel things. The complexity-and often
enough, the audacity-of his style is thus attuned to the fullest range of our
cognitive and affective capabilities.
Just as importantly, Nietzsche repeatedly insists that the reader exercise his
own independence and generosity and that the reader recognize that a stated
position, viewpoint, or claim is in fact merely the statement of its author-that
it is partial, provisional, and limited to the concerns of its author, as well as to
the circumstances of its utterance. In this sense, Nietzsche would claim that
his writings were "perspectival," that they assumed the meaning or significance
they did by virtue of occupying a certain perspective and by having a particular
context. Each statement, then, occupies a position with regard to other state
ments, to a particular set of references and concerns, to the author's stated or
implied intentions, to the nature of their rhetorical formulation, and to the
specific place, time, history, and culture that subtends them-all this multi
plied and factored by the respective context of the reader who interprets them,
in short, with regard to the equally particular interlocutor, who constitutes but
one of many possible audiences, each with its own unique and distinctive for
mation.20 Doubtless, these considerations are complex, and they tend to make
any claim upon Nietzsche's final judgments equally complex.
What the reader should keep in mind to aid in sorting out these complicat
ing factors of interpretation is the predominant concern Nietzsche has with
ethics and morals, understood in the broad sense as the Greek ethos (character)
and as the Latin

nwres

(customs and manners), which is to say, ethics and

morals seen as those conventional patterns of action, judgment, value, and be
havior that govern the life of an individual and structure the society within
which the individual lives.
It should be noted that Nietzsche generally writes

against

the prevailing

tradition, and in doing so he is fully sensitive to the properties or principles
that define the tradition as a coherent system. For this reason, Nietzsche will
often

employ the most traditional oppositions within the reservoir of its signifi

cant codes, to question, criticize, contradict, and fracture the coherence of the
system itself-and thereby, also, the hold, the constrictive purchase, that the
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traditional system exercises upon both the individual and his or her culture.
Nietzsche would later thematize this task, and, in an ironic turn of phrase, lend
its name as a subtitle to his work of 1888-Twilight of the Idols; or,

Philosophy with a Hammer. 21

How to Do

Furthermore, and we should keep this on the

horizon, such a task will raise the strongest question-for Nietzsche and for a
tradition-the question of totality, the very possibility of an exhaustive, totaliz
ing understanding of human and natural existence.22
Let us anticipate the kind of subject matter Nietzsche wished to criticize in
traditional ethics and moral theory by constructing a brief grid or taxonomy, a
system of classification for identifying the possible content of these ethical and
moral systems. In doing so, we want to see the outlines and contours of the
various concepts that form a set of oppositions-oppositions of meanings,
terms, and concepts-within

any

reflection on human activity, individual or

social. This shall serve as a key or guide to a reading of The

Gay Science and

as an aid in recognizing the broad themes that will emerge from it. What are
these basic, foundational oppositions of meanings and concepts? One risks em
barrassment in mentioning them, since they constitute the very vocabulary of
our own speech; without them, little makes sense. Nonetheless, when the
terms of these oppositions are directed back against themselves, back against
similarly paired oppositions in the system of our reflection on ethical and moral
concepts, they can assume a terrifying agency of critique. Gilles Deleuze, for
example, likens Kafka's use of his adopted language (i.e., from Yiddish to Ger
man) to Nietzsche's critical employment of these defining categories of thought
and action: "To confound all codes is not easy, even on the simplest level of
writing and thought. The only parallel I can find here [i.e., to Nietzsche] is
with Kafka, in what he does to German, working within the language of Prague
Jewry; he constructs a battering ram out of German and turns it against it
self."23
Among the many consenting pairs of concepts which, together and system
atically, fuse to form the general subject matter of ethical and moral reflection,
at least the following should be noted:
absolute I relative

gain I loss

action I reaction

give I receive

body I soul

good I evil

cause I effect

immanent I transcendent

conscious I unconscious

intent I deed

faith I knowledge

life I death
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male I female
nature I culture
origin I goal
pleasure I pain
positive I negative
pretended I actual
public I private
rational I irrational
sensible I immaterial
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strength /weakness
subject I predicate
substance I accident
success I failure
theory I practice
time I eternity
true I false
utility I truth

If one adds to these terms all the conceptual and logical oppositions formed by
the prefixes a-, un-, im-, in-, non-, super-, supra-, infra-, para-, meta-, and so
on, much less those oppositions governed by such grammatical concerns as
gender, tense, case, voice, and so forth, one begins to sense the enormous
scope of such an underlying, systematic character to human reflection. This
inventory or vocabulary of opposed concepts will constitute what Nietzsche
termed the unconscious "grammar" of thought, and it serves as the very code,
the very system, of philosophical intelligibility.24 As such, it is by the involution,
the recursive function of the code (i.e. , when he turns certain elements of the
code back upon the whole system of ethics and morality) that Nietzsche first
starts his own distinctive analysis. By means of this code, we can understand
the major themes or motifs in any system of ethics-we can view the stresses
and predominant structures that inhabit any such system. By criticizing one set
of oppositions from the standpoint of another and by analyzing the result from
the perspective of a third or fourth set, we can begin to ask the kinds of ques
tions that Nietzsche typically poses and begin to see the organic character
claimed by, or implicit in, any particular system. 2"
One can demand of a particular assertion or judgment, drawn from a partic
ular ethical system, that it answer as to its stated origin, as to its pretended or
actual origin. One can continue to locate the effective agency of such issues in
the conscious intentions of that doctrine's founder, or, on the contrary, in the
subconscious habits of its quotidian propagators, its followers, and adherents.
What purpose or good, for example, does the particular ethical or moral posi
tion serve? What are its organizing principles? Who, in fact or in principle,
derives benefit from the particular ethical code in question? Does it largely
serve to benefit its followers?-the public at large?-the founder of the reli
gious sect or of the political party?-its priests and agents?-the secular rul
ers?-the prince?-anyone?
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It may be objected that many of Nietzsche's analyses thus stated are psycho
logical, if not even pathological, in origin, in that they tend to stress the motiva
tional patterns of concept formation or of ethical justification. In this sense, it
is often said that Nietzsche defends those conditions that serve to establish a
position rather than the validity of the claim or the truth of the position itself.
Nietzsche's counter? That veracity-truth itself-is also motivated, as is consis
tency, as are the very norms of verification and justification themselves.26 More
over, they, too, constitute part of the systematic coherency claimed by the
larger code. Each presumed "ground" or "origin" or "final account" or "in the
beginning" or "original intent" testifies to a vertiginous spiral of presupposi
tions, prejudices, and agendas beneath it, prior to it---caves behind caves, as
he would say in

'Zarathustra.

Such a tendency to stress the deep motivational aspects of statements or
positions acknowledges a mechanics of action and reaction on the level of the
individual and the group. A set of oppositions like the one Nietzsche proposes
seeks in many cases to explain the deeper, underlying system of

needs

that

gives rise to the construction and elaboration of particular ethical or moral
codes, which would in tum govern the course of our action. Such deep-seated
origins clearly result in more than a particular set of rules. Unconscious and
unstated drives also incline the individual to interpret his culture and his world
in congruence with his needs or desires, and this in tum gives rise to particular
evaluations of reality-and these evaluations (i.e., ethical and moral values) are
subsequently reflected in the higher-order constructions of literature, mythol
ogy, religion, philosophy, politics, and the sciences.27 That this tendency may
often lend itself to the informal fallacy of ad hominem argumentation does not
seem to be one of Nietzsche's principal concerns. In fact, he seems to welcome
its "supplementary" value: 'Tm not afraid to cite names: one illustrates one's
point of view very quickly when, here or there, one argues

ad hominem.

For

me, all this enhances clarity."28

NIETZSCHE'S PSYCHOHISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF MORALITY
AND RELIGION

Perhaps more strikingly than any other determining factor, morality finds its
distant origins in fear, that is, in human weakness and despair, in a terrible
sickness of the will-at least, this is one of Nietzsche's most frequently stated
hypotheses, throughout the entire span of his writings.29 Of course, Nietzsche
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was not alone in this view; the English philosopher of the seventeenth century
Thomas Hobbes, for example, saw this general human fear as the condition for
a social contract, for the origin of the civil state, the state he called the ugly
beast Leviathan. Hobbes postulated that the state was initially constructed by
means of a majority consent or contract, namely, a mutual agreement, a cove
nant, that would serve to combine the several weak and dispersed agencies of
the many in order to combat the excesses of the powerful few. The majority of
individuals, each on his own, might well desire to take charge of his own life,
possessions, and situation and to conquer his opponents by force of arms. Un
fortunately, as individuals, they are effectively powerless to do so in the face of
those few other individuals who are naturally strong. The solution to such a
state of natural inequality-a natural state of war, as Hobbes expressed it-was
for the weak to gather themselves together for their mutual security and to
construct a political state so as to collectively safeguard what little they did
possess, rather than to lose all of it to the rapacity of those few individuals who
were readily capable of violent conquest.30
In very general terms, Nietzsche's account of the origin of religion may be
said to be constructed by analogy to Hobbes's account of the state.31 For Nietz
sche, religion especially begins in fear of the gods. In fact, Nietzsche maintains
that man himself invented the gods out of a more primordial fear. The initial
fear of an unbridled and destructive nature gave rise to the invention of the
gods as a controlling force and countermeasure. Such a presumed divine om
nipotence, however, gave rise to a second fear, namely, a fear of the gods them
selves. This in turn resulted in mankind's voluntary submission to the divine,
that is, in the formation of religions. Nietzsche's account of the origin of reli
gion and the system of ethics and morality it entails, may thus be briefly sum
marized: awestruck by the force and violence of nature, by the cataclysmic
upheavals of the world that are far beyond man's effective control, early man
postulated a unifying cause and origin to them, one that was also beyond his
control. He did this, Nietzsche argues, by a rather rude analogy, by supposing
there was some kind of will or intention behind these natural events:
Every thoughtless person supposes that will alone is effective . . . . The will is for
him a magically effective force; the faith in the will

as

the cause of effects is the

faith in magically effective forces. Now man believed originally that wherever he
saw something happen, a will had to be at work in the background

as

a cause,

and a personal, willing being. Any notion of mechanics was far from his mind.
But since man believed, for immense periods of time, only in persons . . . the
faith in cause and effect became for him the basic faith that he applies wherever
anything happens . . . it is an atavism of the most ancient origin.32
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In the same way that primitive man demanded gratification from his imme
diate family or from his own community and subjected them to abuse when
they failed to please his slightest whims, so he postulated that there was, like
wise, a
natural

higher cause beyond these natural events, some cause behind these
effects, these terrifying spectacles of nature-volcanic eruptions and

earth-rending quakes, frightfully destructive hurricanes and ravaging floods,
lightning-generated

firestorms,

uncontrollable

outbursts

of disease and

plague-in short, some cause or intention that also, like man himself, seemed
to demand a kind of gratification or appeasement, a particular duty or obliga
tion, some praise or pleasure from mankind, and, it should be added, at man
kind's expense. Primitive peoples thus initially invented the divine and
continued to live in fear of its wrath. By analogy, the primitive ancestor pro
jected his own rancorous spirit upon the whole of nature and supposed that
there was a far more powerful agent who exercised a similarly perverse will
upon the world at large and upon humanity in particular. Not only, then, is
there held to be a god, but it is a god whose motives and intentions dramatically
reflect man's own weak and impotent psyche: a god who demands obeisance,
fear, and capitulation-or, as Judaism and Christianity will say, a jealous god, a
vengeful god.
The Christian presupposes a powerful, overpowering being who enjoys revenge.
His power is so great that nobody could possibly harm him, except for his honor.
Every sin is a slight to his honor, a

crimen laesae majestatis divinae-and

no

more. Contrition, degradation, rolling in the dust-all this is the first and last
condition of his grace: in sum, the restoration of his divine honor. Whether the
sin has done any other harm, whether it has set in motion some profound calam
ity that will grow and seize one person after another like a disease and strangle
them-this honor-craving Oriental in heaven could not care less! Sin is an offense
against him, not against humanity. Those who are granted his grace are also
granted this carelessness regarding the natural consequences of sin. God and
humanity are separated so completely that a sin against humanity is really un
thinkable: every deed is to be considered solely with respect to its supernatural
consequences, without regard for its natural consequences.33

God, who is invented by man, thus appears (through retrospective infer
ence, Nietzsche would say) as the very cause and ordering principle of natural
existence.34 Moreover, a god so conceived demands a particular course of action
and behavior from his subjects, in accordance with his purposefully crafted
universe. This is the origin of what Western religion and philosophy will call

natural law, the order and rule within the design of God's universe.

In further
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agreement with human pride, Nietzsche notes, it is supposed, in Europe and
the West at least, that the universe is rational, logical, because this trait reflects
the highest capacity of human nature. It is this human nature, or self, that is
now

projected to godhead:

man differs from the brutes, the "lesser" animals,

in that he possesses speech, reason, and logic. That is, mankind displays its very
essence-rationality-in its thoughts and actions. Cherishing this distinctive
possession of rationality out of overweening pride, because, after all, it is the
only property that truly elevates humanity above the beasts, mankind then proj
ects it onto the divine. With this projection, God henceforth becomes under
stood as the source of rationality, the overbounding source of rational order-as
is manifest in tum, throughout the created world. The ordered seasons, the
regular growth of plants and animals, the ordered movements of the heavenly
spheres themselves, all have been traditional testimony to a universe of divine,
rational creation.35
According to the traditional account, people have come to understand them
selves as products of this grand creation. For millennia of Western thought, the
rational individual occupied a unique and privileged place in what Arthur Love
joy has termed "the great chain of being"-a rationally ordered universe that
extends from the godhead and the angelic natures down to the lowliest organ
ism, down to the dust itself. By the same token, mankind is also subject to an
absolute

rrwrality,

a system of absolute commandments that are promulgated

by the creator god. The authority of this divine lawgiver is absolute, and so is
its extent. As payment, as compensation, for our dutiful travail of obedience to
the divinely ordained moral law, it is supposed, or at least hoped, that we will

otherworldly
outside of life,

be rewarded with an afterlife-an eternal life in heaven-in this
region we only get intimations of in our dreams, the one area

where our impoverished wishes and hopes are to be fulfilled, once and for all,
where our tedium with

this

human life of suffering will be miraculously re

lieved and our sore afflictions remedied. In this sense, the afterlife, as con
ceived in the religions of the West, serves as a longed-for escape from pain and
dissatisfaction, a desperate flight from this world. The afterworld, the other
world-heaven itself-thus stands as an anesthetic balm of Gilead for our all
too-real existence in this world.
After this whole progression of the argument, Nietzsche goes one step fur
ther to point out the moment of greatest deceit: like the civil servant or the
corporate executive who attains recognition and self-respect according to his
position in the managerial hierarchy, our own personal existence

first time,

now,

for the

is understood to be objectively meaningful.36 We now belong to the
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well-ordered universe and become what we are, who we are, precisely in func
tion of the divine order. We are rational because he is. We properly and reli
giously guide ourselves by universal, rational principles. Our destructive
passions are guided and channeled by our so-called "higher faculties," and all
this reflects and enhances the glory that is the divine.37
But more and more, the whole system of religious conviction and practice
evolves into habit and passive belief in the system . This order of universal
purpose and meaning has, for millennia, been so thoroughly invested into our
very psyches and societies that personal understanding, self-respect, and es
teem become wholly dependent upon the explanations of religion or, what for
Nietzsche is the same thing, frightened superstition. We continually crave that
our existence be rendered objectively meaningful and morally justified by the
Almighty-that it be reaffirmed and approved time and again-but, for Nietz
sche, when God dies and a secular age begins, our long-held religious beliefs
and the needs that have been so deeply formed by those beliefs will still have
to be fulfilled and reaffirmed. For a secular age, however, such fulfillment will
be henceforth performed through another agency, whether this be politics,
science, moral causes, or something else in tum.
Given the history and provenance of this entire epoch, Nietzsche effectively
poses the subsequent questions: "Why maintain this system? Why not an
other?"38 Perhaps we should experiment with an infinitude of possible systems
to find a morality that does not inculcate shame, guilt, impotence, fear, and
superstition in its adherents-not to speak of suppressed rage and boundless
greed. Aren't all the conflicting moralities, not only within the traditions of the
West but throughout history and worldwide, themselves readily explained by
observation, by hypothesis and empirical verification? Perhaps the ancient
Greek religious poet Hesiod simply drank too much ·and merely conjured up
the Olympian gods. Perhaps Abraham and St. Paul were themselves victimized
early on in life, bereft of love and instruction-stranger things have been
known to happen. Can't we easily see how the ideals of a society are themselves
generated from its work habits, its expectations, anticipations, and dreams?39
Isn't the Viking Valhalla different from the Elysian Fields of Greek bucolic
poets? Isn't the corporate banker's god different from that of the Central
European peasant, or of mountain tribesmen in Persia, or of the Eritrean
mystic?
Nietzsche's response to these issues is relatively succinct. By inventing-by
constructing-this world of God's design and rational order, mankind has quite
simply made two mistakes: First, overvaluing his own worth and projecting this
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to the status of creative godhead, and second, taking his own thought too seri
ously, overvaluing his own rationality. Nature, therefore, becomes fixed on the
model of man himself: it becomes

anthropomorphized,

cast in the form of

man-and rationalized. In truth, it is quite independent of man (and of God)
and indifferent to any human order. Mankind imputes purpose and causality to
something that is inherently

indifferent to reason,

morality, or motivation. He

imputes unity and order when in fact there is only relative chaos and complete
lack of rationality. As Nietzsche would say at the very beginning of his

1873

essay, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,"
In some remote comer of the universe, poured out and glittering in innumerable
s�lar systems, there once was a star on which clever animals invented knowledge.
That was the haughtiest and most mendacious minute of "world history," yet only
.

a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths the star grew cold, and the clever
animals had to die . . . . There is nothing in nature so despicable or insignificant
that it cannot be blown up like a bag by the slightest breath of this power of
[human] knowledge; and just

as

every porter wants an admirer, the proudest

human being, the philosopher, thinks that he sees the eyes of the universe tele
scopically focused from all sides on his actions and thoughts.41'

These are fundamental errors for Nietzsche. But, at the same time, they are
necessary errors, necessary illusions. They are human abstractions or fictions
that are nonetheless useful for life: we impute concepts such as strict causality,
moral purposiveness, rational order, and logical unity when there are none.
Across the teeming profusion of particulate and subparticulate activity, we very
grossly impute the fictions of unity, enduring substance, and names that point
to a supposedly identical thing. In fact, there is largely confusion and differ
ence.41
Our identifying, unifying, and expressing a verbal similarity are only a conve
nient fiction imposed from without, and we do this out of biological necessity:
we

need

to describe, categorize, and identify if we are to find and cultivate

food, exchange information, and provide for the necessities of human life. It is
the necessary function of the intellect to lie, and therefore to abstract, general
ize, idealize, conceptualize. The whole conceptual order, the whole religious
order, the whole conventional moral, ethical, and religious, not to mention
philosophical, order is precisely a fabric of lies. What is important is not so
much the truth of these concepts, but rather, the effects and beliefs that are
engendered by them. Truth is a construction, an arbitrary fiction, that is agreed
upon and valued, as long as it remains plausible and necessary for the continu
ance of life. There could be better ways.
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THE GAY SCIENCE: THE DEATH OF GOD

Doubtless, the most striking theme introduced by

The Gay Science is what

Nietzsche termed "the Death of God." That, and its purported consequences,
best serve to open up the broad concerns of the present work. Let us first
attend to the "event" of God's death, as Nietzsche formulates it in paragraph

125,

surely one of the most dramatic passages in his entire corpus:

Have you ever heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning
hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek
God!"42-As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around
just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose
his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he
gone on a voyage? emigrated?-Thus they yelled and laughed.
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.
" Whither is God?" he cried; "I will tell you.

We have killed him-you and

I. All

of us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink up the
sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we
doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now?
Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually?
Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or down? Are
we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of
empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on
us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet
of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as
yet of the divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God re
mains dead. And we have killed him.
"How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was
the holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death
under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to
clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have
to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves
not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater
deed; and whoever is born after us-for the sake of this deed he will belong to a
higher history than all history hitherto."
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too,
were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the
ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. "I have come too early," he said
then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wander
ing; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time;
the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require time to be
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seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant
stars-and yet they have done it themselves."
It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way
into several churches and there struck up his requiem aetemam deo [requiem for
the eternal God]. Led out and called to account, he is said always to have replied
nothing but: "What after all are these churches now if they are not the tombs
and sepulchers of God?"43
An assertion of such magnitude requires at least the following clarification,
in the form of a question: namely, "Who is this God?" Or, stated somewhat
differently, we must first establish his divine provenance, his paternity, his ori
gin and identity. Certainly, such a God is not merely the image or figural repre
sentation of a personally conceived deity-rendered particular by experience,
faith, or doctrine. Rather, what Nietzsche is concerned with in this polemic is
the God of the West, of Europe and Persia, of Rome and Athens. It is first of
all the God of Being, of all that is real, all that exists: "I am He who am," the
Old Testament tells us. Such a God is the creator, the source of Being and of
all things. He is the first cause, the material cause, the efficient cause, the
formal cause, and the final cause. This is what we have come to know as the
God of Genesis.44
Yet such a God is also the God of truth, he is the neo-Platonic inspiration
for St. John the Divine. In this sense, he speaks across the New Testament: " I
a m the

word,"

the word made "flesh." Let u s not b e mistaken: the word in

question, of course, is the

logos,

the philosophical pattern of rationality and

intelligibility that theologians and philosophers, like St. Augustine, will find
reflected and incarnated everywhere throughout the universe. To see nature in
this fashion is literally to recognize the traces of God therein. Nature itself and
human nature stand as the very signature and substance of his rational creation.
It is precisely in this way that Western morality, philosophy, and theology are
essentially united. The Judeo-Christian tradition repeats the founding doc
trines of Plato and of Greek antiquity, and this is to be echoed at every period
and from every thinker in philosophy and religion for the next two millennia
across Plotinus, Eriugena, Bonaventura, the medieval theologians to Descartes,
Kant, Hegel, and right down to the present day. The study of nature and man
is essentially one with that of religion. It is this totality which Martin Heidegger
has called the Western tradition of ontotheology, that is, the study of being as
such, of what is, or, metaphysics.45
The Good, the Beautiful, and the True for Plato and Greek philosophy be
come the Way, the Light, and the Truth for two thousand years of Western
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thought. The source of Being is also the source of value and truth. Our rational

concepts ultimately find their true referent in the mind of God. Being finds its
source in the grace of God, and values find their strict justification and vindica
tion in the will of God.46
The death of God, then, does not just mean that a social or political revolu
tion will simply choose to dispense with the organized practice of a particular
religious faith. Rather, what is at stake-and this is why the malingerers and
idlers in the marketplace do not fully comprehend the

rrwgnitude

of God's

death-is the rejection, the toppling, of metaphysics: the very demise of onto
theology. The event of God's death, therefore, signifies the passing away of
religion, philosophy, and morality as we have come to know them-as we have
come to know it-across the history of Western thought. What this passing
away ultimately means for Nietzsche will have to be patiently assembled
throughout the course of his various works. Here in

The Gay Science, however,

he says that the death of God is the "Lucifer-match," the spark that ignites the
whole of our all-too-volatile tradition.
In view of Nietzsche's extraordinary assertion about the death of God, the
subsequent question quickly ensues: namely, "how did God's death occur?"
Even more perplexing, how is this death, even now, continuing its reverbera
tion, its death-rattle or

rigor mortis? Perhaps the image of a bloody murder is

too strong and violent for this deicide. Elsewhere, Nietzsche suggests that, one
day, God simply found himself locked out of the church, temple, and mosque.
In this sense, we could say that God simply died of atrophy, that there was no
longer felt to be a need for the old God.47 His function as creator, confessor,
balm, judge, and accountant was replaced by another agency, namely, by sci

ence,

and by another faith-the faith and belief in an omnipotent

technology.

If fear and weakness generated the need for a God, for a divine alter ego,
those original wellsprings are now far better gratified by something new, by
something whose worth and efficacy are more easily demonstrable. The death
of God in the narrower sense (i.e., the specifically theological and doxological
office of the divine) is thus really an exchange, a substitution, of one belief
system for another. The Judeo-Christian God eventually comes to be replaced
by the new marvel of a universal scientific order of creation, production, and
rationally consistent explanation-in which case, there is little need any more
for the modem citizen to sacrifice the first-born child or to pull out his or her
own hair in remonstration or atonement. Plagues and pests are more readily
subdued by insecticides. Droughts and inundations are more easily calmed by
dams and irrigation networks.
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Not only does the rise of the new sciences, beginning with the Enlighten
ment, serve to kill the traditional God, but another, related, factor arises from
within the development of Western theology itself to aid in this deicide. Nietz
sche locates this second contributing factor to the death of God in the appear
ance of Martin Luther and the Protestant Reformation. What theological
functions were previously performed by the Roman Catholic priest-the very
real, psychological functions of confession and consolation, the absolution of
sin and guilt-now become the superfluous trappings of an obsolete ecclesiasti
cal hierarchy, due to Luther and the Reformation, and to figures such as John
Calvin, John Knox, and Huldrych Zwingli.
We Europeans confront a world of tremendous ruins. A few things are still tower
ing, much looks decayed and uncanny . . . . The church is this city of destruction:
we see the religious community of Christianity shaken to its lowest foundations;
the faith in God has collapsed . . . . An edifice like Christianity that had been built
so carefully over such a long period . . . naturally could not be destroyed all at
once. All kinds of earthquakes had to shake it, all kinds of spirits that bore, dig,
gnaw, and moisten have had to help. But what is strangest is this: Those who
exerted themselves the most to preserve and conserve Christianity have become
precisely its most efficient destroyers-the Germans.
The Lutheran Reformation was, in its whole breadth, the indignation of sim
plicity against "multiplicity" or, to speak cautiously, a crude, ingenuous misunder
standing in which there is much that calls for forgiveness. One failed to
understand the expression of a

triumphant

church and saw nothing but

corruption . . . . Luther's . . . work, his will to restore that Roman work became,
without his knowing or willing it, nothing but the beginning of a work of destruc
tion. He unraveled, he tore up with honest wrath what the old spider had woven
so carefully for such a long time . . . . He destroyed the concept of the "church"
by throwing away the faith in the inspiration of the church councils; for the con
cept of the "church" retains its power only on condition that the inspiring spirit
that founded the church still lives in it, builds in it, and continues to build its
house . . . . Luther, having given the priest [sexual intercourse with] woman, had
to take away from him auricular confession; that was right psychologically. With
that development the Christian priest was, at bottom, abolished, for his most
profound utility had always been that he was a holy ear, a silent well, a grave
for secrets. "Everyone his own priest''-behind such formulas and their peasant
cunning there was hidden in Luther the abysmal hatred against "the higher
human being."""

All the practical and psychological functions of the priest thus became inter
nalized under the Reformationist doctrine of a personal

conscience:

they be-
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alter ego, which now answers for itself, which finds

its spiritual strength within. Moral duty now becomes a function of the individ
ual's personal thought and labor. The public spectacle of confession becomes
internalized in the form of a private meditation; namely, the cultivation of a
conscience through personal prayer and atonement.
Despite Nietzsche's personal distaste for Luther's "peasant revolt of the
spirit," he nonetheless conceded that Luther's doctrine of a personal dialogue
with the Divine-through personal prayer and atonement-was a stroke of
unexampled genius. For, after all, it was the individual and the value of his or
her own thought and labor that was for centuries suppressed. Luther saw that
it was only under the impersonal office of an ecclesiastical institution that the
church was able to impose itself as mediator, interpreter, judge, and foremost,
spiritual authority. As an impersonal institution, it was responsible to no one
save itself. By its own office of authority, any attempt to question theological
orthodoxy was seen not as a simple difference of opinion or belief, of hetero
doxy, but rather as heresy. Let us not forget that one prohibition of the Old
Testament: "Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge. " That kind of knowl
edge or wisdom ( Latin

scientia)

is not joyous; it will reap the whirlwinds of

pain, suffering, divine wrath, and death.
The wind had nonetheless shifted by the time of the New Testament. It
then blew from Ath en s :

"Know the truth

an d the truth shall make you free . "

This is the God of Plato, the God who demands inspection and answers, for h e

this doctrine o f seeking the
truth, which has both moral and metaphysical dimensions of enormous propor

i s the source o f all truth. Nietzsche asserts that

tions, was a mistake. In it lay the seeds of God's own death, a death which first
becomes evident, we saw, in the rise of the New Sciences and in the Protestant
Reformation. As Nietzsche would remark:
The most fateful act of two thousand years of discipline for truth . . . in the end
forbids itself the

lie

in faith in God. You see what it was that really triumphed

over the Christian god: Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that
was understood ever more rigorously, the father confessor's refinement of the
Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into
intellectual cleanliness at any price.49

The tension between authority and knowledge, belief and truth, or revela
tion and reason had, of course, been developing ever since the early church
began. The problem was essentially that God is held to be the source of univer
sal intelligibility, but he himself is unknowable, inscrutable. To know the world

T H E

G AY

S C I E N C E

9 5

and to understand its divinely wrought order, one must first pass by the media
tion of faith and belief. The how and why of things, the explanation of the
meaning and purpose of nature, had thus traditionally been the exclusive prov
ince of theology.50 Forced to explain the irrational and divine elements of the
rational universe, medieval theologians such as St. Thomas Aquinas and Moses
Maimonides attempted to give an account of the divine nature itself, which
would ideally clarify matters-by means of analogy. To know the world com
pletely we must first know God: precisely, because God is the world's rationally
creative source and ordering principle of truth. But we can only know God
analogically. How, then, is this analogical knowledge of God at all possible?
Aquinas formulates the analogy in the following way:

(1)

(2)

man

God

his products

his products (i.e., creation, the world)

Based on the causal "model" of the "craftsman," this is

an

analogy that is itself

composed of two relations. It is called a four-termed analogy, or the analogy of
proper proportionality, and it seeks to express a relation between relation ( 1 )
and relation (2).5 1 The real problem, o f course, i s that we cannot know relation

(2)

until we know the principal term (God) that is needed to construct the

relation in the first place. Analogy, in short, gets us nowhere. It only appeared
to work on the assumption that the four items mentioned in the analogy be
longed to the same order, the order of continuous magnitude (as Euclid used
the analogy in book 2 of his

Elements).

But this is precisely the difficulty to be

resolved: the relation of the finite to the infinite is not continuous; the two
orders are different in kind, so the relation cannot be finitely fixed. The infinite
term, God, cannot be simply extrapolated from the other three finite terms,
since, by definition, the infinite-whatever it is-is precisely that which

tran

scends the finite.
What fatally compromises any attempt to know the divine nature is that to
know God is to reduce him to the level of human understanding and finitude.
To know God is, in this sense, to kill him. In fact, it was this classic medieval

via affimwtiva: one can have a positive knowl
and nominalism (the via negativa: one can only have a negative

debate, between realism (the
edge of God)

understanding-i.e., only in name), which generated the unsuccessful attempt
at a middle way, or an analogical understanding (the

via analogia),

in the first

place, namely, the possibility of an indirect knowledge of the divine nature.
Hopelessly blocked by these mutually exclusive positions, the historical fig-
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ure who resolves the impasse of analogy-of direct and indirect knowledge of
God-is also the figure who ushers in the humanism of the Renaissance, the
shift from a God-centered universe to one that is man-centered. This figure is
the fifteenth-century mystic Nicholas of Cusa.52 Cusa (or Cusanos) reasoned in
a somewhat negative way in his work of

1440, Learned Ignorance:

if God is

what exceeds our knowledge, then it is sufficient for us to apprehend the great
est possible extent of our own finite, human knowledge. Once we reach the
frontier of our own, positive human knowledge, we will have, by definition,
attained the delimitation of God. Or, as Voltaire well knew, to be at the French
frontier is, at the same time, to see Switzerland. Of dramatic importance here
is that the general focus of intellectual concern is, for once, directed away
from the attempt to grasp the divine nature as such and is turned toward an
understanding of the finite domain of human nature and human experience.
What becomes important for Cusanos and for the whole of the subsequent

(scientia) and hu
(techne). These two human for

period of Renaissance humanism, then, is human thought
manity's productive labor, its human creativity

mations, science and technology, effectively seal God's coffin.
Nicholas of Cusa opens the breach: man now becomes "man the maker"

homo Jaber-far Marsilio Ficino and the

Italian Renaissance, man "the maker

of politics and nations" for Niccolo Machiavelli, man "the master and possessor
of nature" for Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, Isaac Newton, and for a modem
age. For Nietzsche, quite simply, the god of traditional theology is dead be
cause he is useless, superfluous. He has been displaced by the products of
man's own knowledge, by science and technology. Moreover, what he was can
now be explained by this new science, by the universal mathematics and me
chanics of Descartes and the Enlightenment, and ultimately, by Nietzsche him
self: God was a fiction all along, a psychological construct and fabrication.53
Useless and a fiction, he is left to decay-for, as Nietzsche remarked, "even
Gods decompose."

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF GOD

What does Nietzsche recognize as the consequences of God's death? Ini
tially, we can enumerate, at least four-and here we see the wider meaning
Nietzsche ascribes to this event. Certainly, the first effect of God's death is

remove the universal foundations of morality.

to

A dead God no longer has the

power and authority to determine values. There is no longer an absolute or
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transcendent ground for ethics and morality, since there is no ground of au
thority or justification beyond the merely human actions and habits of those
who live. All of which is to say that morality enters into history and that its
claims are strictly conditioned by that history. Religion, ethics, and morality are
merely historical and relative codes for organizing, regulating, and determining
human activity. They are evanescent configurations of a society, a culture,
which vary according to time and place. No longer, then, can one point beyond
life to determine the value of life. Likewise, there can no longer be any univer
sal and absolute moral precepts, maxims, or laws, once the human and natural
orders are understood to be essentially historical. In a striking passage, Nietz
sche remarks, "How much must collapse now that this faith has been under
mined, because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; for
example, the whole of our European morality."54
A second and immediate effect is that we will continue to live under the
shadow of the dead God, we will continue to display his raiments and trappings
for some time. There will begin an age of metaphysical nostalgia that will last
for hundreds of years, a period where we shall be carried along by the mere
inertia and habit of theology and metaphysics. Thus, what powers were for
merly granted to the godhead are now given over to the unbounded belief in
science. Indeed, one often speaks about the "religiosity" of scientism and the
"messianic" appeal of modem technological growth and progress. Nietzsche
even remarks about the "evangelical" character of nihilism and positivism, the
patent rejection of and opposite to Western ontotheology.s.5 Even if the West
ern tradition has generated and sustained a system of artificial needs and be
liefs, an articulated project of weakness, to Nietzsche's mind, it is nonetheless
a system of such comprehensiveness and persistence that it continues to exer
cise its authority at a distance, even as the secular age has lost faith in the
foundational principles of faith.
A third consequence of God's death is that we enter an age of ambiguity
and transition, characterized precisely by that nostalgia for the earlier age. He
calls it an impending age of "breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm."
God's death, we remember, is called the greatest, the most momentous event
in history, yet one whose reverberations are just now beginning to be felt: "This
tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached
the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time." Nietzsche goes on to
observe:
Even we born guessers of riddles who are, as it were, waiting on the mountains,
posted between today and tomorrow, stretched in the contradiction between
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today and tomorrow, we firstlings and premature births of the coming century, to
whom the shadows that must soon envelop Europe really should have appeared
by now-why is it that even we look fmward to the approaching gloom without
any real sense of involvement and above all without any worry and fear for our
selves? Are we perhaps still too much under the impression of the initial conse
quences of this event-and these initial consequences, the consequences for
ourselves, are quite the opposite of what one might perhaps expect: They are not
at all sad and gloomy but rather like a new and scarcely describable kind of light,
happiness, relief, exhilaration, encouragement, dawn. Indeed, we philosophers
and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news that "the old god is dead," as if a
new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premoni
tions, expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it
should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to
face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the
sea,

our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open

sea."56

The title of the section just quoted-"The Meaning of Our Cheerful
ness"-is itself crucial to understanding the importance the event of God's
death will have for Nietzsche and for his own doctrine of a "gay science," a
"joyful wisdom. " The sea, in any case, is now opened: boundless and infinite.

It is upon this open sea of an infinite future that we, of an ambiguous age, are

to wander. Like young Oedipus , we have each killed our father and we are
condemned to leave our father's home:
We who are homeless.-Among Europeans today there is no lack of those who
are entitled to call themselves homeless in a distinctive and honorable sense; it is
to them that I especially commend my secret wisdom and gaya scienza. For their
fate is hard, their hopes are uncertain; it is quite a feat to devise some comfort
for them-but to what avail? We children of the future, how could we be at home
in this today? We feel disfavor for all ideals that might lead one to feel at home
even in this fragile, broken time of transition; as for its "realities," we do not
believe that they will

last. The ice that still supports people today has become

very thin; the wind that brings the thaw is blowing; we ourselves who are home
less constitute a force that breaks open ice and all other too thin "realities." We
"conserve" nothing; neither do we want to return to any past periods.57

To answer the question posed by Schopenhauer (the philosopher who per
haps most influenced Nietzsche in his early years), the question that must now
be asked-"Has existence, then, any significance at all, any meaning whatso
ever?"-Nietzsche responds that the fourth consequence of God's death is the
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Like Cusanos, without God's support, we become

divine. We now become the responsible bearers of world and history. Our
existence will embrace this whole, and no other, world; it will invoke no sanc
tion or salvation outside the world. For Nietzsche, we shall embrace the
thought of the "eternal return" and this will be our newly found significance, a
significance that will transfigure reality, humanity, and history as we now know
them. Indeed, this shall be our "gay science."

OVERCOMING A N D AFFI RMATION

Let us briefly summarize our reading of The Gay

Science. We recall that it is

one of Nietzsche's most central works-he called it his "most medial [central]
work"-since it contains, in varying degrees of explicitness, almost all of his
major philosophical themes, his most celebrated teachings: the death of God,
the eternal return, the will to power, and his general critique of morality.
We initially specified the nature of that God, which Nietzsche alleges to
have died: First, He is, or was, the object of conventional worship in the West.
But second, and perhaps more importantly, such an eminent divine was also
the God of Being and of Truth (i.e., the god of traditional metaphysics) . We
made the comparison between the god of Plato and that of the Judea-Christian
tradition and found them to be essentially the same. The Platonic Unity, the
supraessential One, of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True, this is also the
Way, the Light, and the Truth for two millennia of Christendom. Specifically,
the creative God of being is also the source of all value and truth. For the
tradition, all concepts find their highest referent in the mind of God, all being
is created by the grace of God, and all value finds its origin in the will of God.
The realms of being, truth, and value are thus fundamentally united for our
tradition, and this unity, which is our tradition, can be summarily characterized
by the term

ontotheology.

We also saw that the death, the passing, of this God was explained by the
development of two historical trends, two historical events: the rise of science
and technology, beginning with Renaissance humanism

and extending

throughout the Enlightenment; and the Protestant Reformation. It was the
latter that replaced the mediating authority of the priest, the church's ecclesias
tical hierarchy, with the doctrine of an internalized conscience (i.e., a moral
and intellectual self-responsibility exercised by the individual) . In short, the
Enlightenment and the Reformation present us with the historical beginnings
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of a rigorous personal autonomy, of personal and practical independence.
God's death, of course, is hardly a simple affair: "After Budda was dead, his
shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave-a tremendous, gruesome
shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for
thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.-And we-we still have
to vanquish his shadow."58
Following God's death, we become both his executors and legatees: it re
mains for us to administer this-his-divine estate. We already specified four
consequences of this "greatest event in history":
passed away.

(2)

( 1)

Absolute morality has

We shall continue to live, inertially, under the effects of the

old god. His agency will be transferred, however, to a variety of substitutes:
science and technology, but also moral causes, political movements, and ideolo
gies-all having an implicit eschatological or redemptive, salvational function
.

to them.

(3) We thereby enter

an age of transition and ambiguity. Nothing is

sure, nothing certain, although we may desperately-nostalgically-wish some
thing were.

(4)

Finally, we become only gradually, progressively, aware of the

effects of our newly found freedom-in such a way that the old ontotheological
beliefs are seen to belong to a past era; the belief in a divine creation, the
concept of rational causation, or the belief in any universal moral purpose and
destiny now appears to be simply a vestige of the old faith, the leftover shards
or shrouds that still linger about the coffin of the dead god. The world no
longer appears as a purposive or rational order, nor does it plausibly reflect any
aspect of the divine:
The astral order in which we live is an exception; this order and the relative
duration that depends on it have again made possible an exception of exceptions:
the formation of the organic. The total character of the world, however, is in all
eternity chaos-in the sense not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrange
ment, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aes
thetic anthropomorphisms . . . it is neither perfect, nor beautiful, nor noble, nor
does it wish to become any of these things; it does not by any means strive to
imitate man. None of our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it.59

Nonetheless, even we, whom Nietzsche terms the "firstlings and premature
births of the coming century," still remain bound by these old shrouds, by these
lingering shadows on the walls of the Platonic cave. We still have to overcome
the old morality-or at least this is what Nietzsche sees as our immediate task:
If one would like to see our European morality for once as it looks from a dis
tance, and if one would like to measure it against other moralities, past and fu-
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ture, then one has to proceed like a wanderer who wants to know how high the
towers in a town are: he

leaves the town.

"Thoughts about moral prejudices," if

out
side morality, some point beyond good and evil to which one has to rise, climb,
or fly-and in the present case at least a point beyond our good and evil, a
they are not meant to be prejudices about prejudices, presuppose a position

freedom from everything "European," by which I mean the sum of the imperious
value judgments that have become part of our flesh and blood.60

As a result of such an overcoming, such a distancing from all that which consti
tutes our present natures, Nietzsche envisions the emergence of a transformed
human subject, one who would find joy in this new prospect:
One could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a

freedom

of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish

for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and
possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free

spirit

par excellence.61

But would this appeal be merely one rrwre exhortation for us to act in a
particular way? Is Nietzsche simply following the structural pattern in tum
filling in the "old God" dictates, the litany of the "thou shalt"-with the pre
cepts, rules, and moral exhortations of the "new man"? Is Nietzsche one more
preacher, yet another didactic at best or authority figure at worst? Is this text
meant to convey, to inspire, an evangelism for the new Calvinist elect? Is he a
zealot? Another Luther or Zwingli in atheist disguise?62 And just as Zwingli's
followers threw the Bavarian Catholic emissaries out of the Prague town hall

window in

1618,

shall Nietzsche himself be "defenestrated" in tum, only to

await the next prophet of yet another new world order?63
In any case, Nietzsche surely does not pose himself as one more replace
ment prophet: this would be to profoundly misunderstand Nietzsc.he's own,
that is, a positive, conception of morality. His expression is not meant to gratify
the fearful weak-for he urges no desultory escape from pain, from life, into a
fictional world of imaginary compensation. Nor is his work simply meant to be
a palliative or tonic for the confused spirit of a troubled Europe. Why, then,
does he write? To surround himself with followers? Clearly not!-and if he did,
he failed dramatically. Indeed, Nietzsche continually chides his readers: he asks
to be criticized, not to be adulated. Nietzsche knows full well that the large
majority of followers and converts bear only the resentment and helplessness
that ceaselessly search out the next command, the next dictate, the next author
ity to whom they would willingly submit.64 While Nietzsche does tell us that he
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writes as a way of "getting rid of my thoughts,"65 this may well be an act of
grace, but it is certainly not to proselytize nor to institute a new sect-in the
fashion of, for example, the French positivist, Auguste Comte. He writes only

for those who have already become matured: "We are, in one word . . . good
Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obli
gated heirs of thousands of years of European spirit. As such, we have also
outgrown Christianity, and are averse to it-precisely because we have grown
out of it."66

As for the others, those individ�als who have not yet matured, Nietzsche

remarks, " What can it matter to us with what tinsel the sick may use to cover
up their weaknesses? . . . We know full well the hysterical little men and women
who need this present religion and morality as a cloak and adomment."67 To
these people, Nietzsche implores, one simply must be generous. Believers, he
says, invariably have a profound need to believe, a need that in one way or
another, testifies strikingly to their own infirmity:
Metaphysics is still needed by some; but so is that impetuous

demand for cer

tainty that today discharges itself among large numbers of people in a scientific
positivistic form. The demand that one wants by all means that something should
be firm (while on account of the ardor of this demand one is easier and more
negligent about the demonstration of this certainty)-this, too, is still the demand
for a support, a prop, in short, that instinct

of weakness which,

to be sure, does

not create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions of all kinds but
conserves them. 68

In a very concrete sense, therefore, Nietzsche seems to be writing for those
people who don't need to read him. His audience is calculated to be precisely
those for whom the old order is already beginning to gray, and for whom such
beliefs are beginning to appear as empty shells, stale fodder, lifeless conven
tions, whether these beliefs be of God or are directed to his modem placehold
ers or surrogates. That modem science is such a preeminent surrogate for
Nietzsche is clear:
We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no science "without
presuppositions." . . . From where would science then be permitted to take its
unconditional faith or conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important
than any other thing, including every other conviction? . . . But you will have
gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a

metaphysical faith

upon

which our faith in science rests-that even we seekers after knowledge today, we
godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith
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that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of
Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.-But what if this should become
more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless
it were error, blindness, the lie-if God himself should prove to be our most

·

enduring lie ?69

According to Nietzsche's analysis, then, we are prepared to confront, to
appraise, and to evaluate the entire tradition. For a modern secular age, there
is no longer the universally felt need to be constrained by the ancient morality
of God and religion, or by its more recent surrogates-totalizing ideologies of
the left or right, extremist forms of nationalism, utopian economic or moral
movements, ethnic and political irredentism , and so forth.7° If the possibility
of overcoming this tradition is prepared by our newfound maturity, then Nietz
sche's own agency is, indeed, but emblematic; he is only the Orpheus, the
"Lucifer match. " With no divine impediments or pedigrees, mankind for the
first time becomes "liberated" by the awareness of "this greatest event of his
tory," the death of God.
Where does Nietzsche suggest we commence such an undertaking? Where
does one situate oneself for such an impending transformation? With the ad
mission of a godless universe, there is no longer an opposition between human
and divine, between immanent and transcendent, not to speak of the opposi
tion between what is absolute and what is historical or relative. In a strict sense,
the death of God

is

the greatest event in history: it is the beginning of a reso

lutely autonomous human history as such. No longer are we but a dim reflec
t ion or a

"

m oving image" of eternity. With the death of God, we have fallen

into time.
The beginning of this undertaking already lies "beyond good and evil," be
yond the ancient values and the purportedly "eternal" truths. Humanity, for
Nietzsche, is no longer fixed as a divinely ordained measure in the whirlpool
of things. The human individual is no longer bound by his supposed divinely
given essence, that of being essentially rational. Rather, humanity is now to be
conceived of in purely natural terms. The individual is to be situated-and
understood---on the ontological plane of nature itself. But, realize that now,
for Nietzsche, nature is itself undeified: it is not a created product that finds its
source elsewhere. For a modern age, nature is both created and creative: it
affects itself and continually transforms itself. It is no longer conceived simply
as created-much less in the divine image of an eternal and rational God.
What, then, is nature? For Nietzsche, nature is at once chaos and necessity;
it is profuse, luxuriant, teeming with excess and superabundance. Yet, nature
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is also cold, exact, bound to its sempiternal rhythms. The natural order continu
ally transforms itself, neither increasing nor diminishing overall. It is, in this
sense, a " finite" but "open" economy. All of which is to say that Nietzsche
conceives nature to be fixed in its quantity of matter, energy, or force. In this
respect, nature is finite. But, by the same token, this finite nature continues to
operate dynamically in an infinite time. Thus a balance of sorts is attained; with
neither absolute growth nor absolute diminution, nature both conserves its
energy absolutely and expends it continually in the natural processes of organic
and inorganic metamorphosis. Nature never simply
attain a final or terminal state of fixed

Being.

is, in the sense that it could

Rather, it continually "changes,"

it continually "evolves" or "becomes." What characterizes nature's economy,
then, is a vicious Malthusian rigor. Its economy demands continual reinvest
ment and churning: quanta of forces fuse, stress, contract, and factor out to
the next series and chain of impulses, into the next self-transformation, the
next metamorphosis.
This is a kind of "order" if you will, and as natural beings, we are already
part and parcel of it. In the absence of any transcendent order, nature for once
becomes our human dominion. Upon God's death, we become naturalized citi
zens. We are no longer to be thought of as Gnostic exiles from an "otherworld,''
since there is no eternal country of origin or reprieve. There is no resting place
of the soul, either, by the still waters, n o r is there even an alien substance, or

counter-substance, called the

soul,

that could somehow stand by impassively,

unnaturally. It is in this sense Nietzsche would assert:
The living being, moreover, is only a species of dead being, and a very rare spe
cies at that-let us be on our guard against thinking that the world eternally
creates the

new.

Moreover, there are no eternally enduring substances: matter

and soul are just such errors as the God of the Eleatics. But when shall we be at
an end with our foresight and precaution? When will all these shadows of God
cease to obscure us? When shall we be permitted to naturalize ourselves by
means of the pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?71

Just how is this naturalization possible, then, and how do we "wanderers"
become

at home, in nature, and what is the economics ofthis relation between

man and nature, man and world? It is misleading to think that a traditional
scientific account of nature would be called for at this point, precisely because
"natural" science effectively

denatures

this relationship. It interprets nature,

first of all, in the light of man, in light of purely subjective abstractions.72 The
traditional view thus gives a subjective, anthropomorphic account of nature
and calls this

idealizing construction ,

this series of images, "objective. "73

·
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For Nietzsche, there would be a double fault: science conceives nature in
terms of our quite human abstractions, generalizations, and idealizations. Na
ture, therefore, is seen in the image of man-just as God was, according to
Nietzsche's account of the origins of religion. Second, it is claimed by science
that this construction has nothing to do with subjectivity, that it is in fact the
exact opposite. The scientific account, we are told, is the paradigm of objectiv
ity. Hence, the individual human subject is necessarily pitted against the world
and occupies a place that could only be termed unnatural. At best, humanity
seems to occupy and rule from some sort of refugee camp.
The whole pose of "man against the world," man as a "world-negating" principle,
of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the
end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting-the monstrous
insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We laugh
as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of "man

and world," separated by the

sublime presumption of the little word "and. "74

In order to

become naturalized,

in Nietzsche's sense, the individual must

embrace nature, ultimately, by an act of will. He must willingly accept the
natural order on its own terms. For Nietzsche, this means we must
chaos and necessity, and, by the same token, we must
that

separates

destroy

affirm its

the little "and"

us from nature. Destruction, here, consists in a denial of that

tradition-bound intellectual and ideological filter, that smoke-screen mediation
of all the images, beliefs, projections, fictions, and shadows that are the vestiges
of the "dead God," of ontotheology. Specifically, this calls for a kn owin g denial

of the "second nature" that, over the course of millennia, had become our "first
nature. "7·5 This task would amount to a critical deconstruction of our tradition:
it would consist in a critique of those historically derived notions of causality,
unity, substance, identity, divisible time, rationality, logic, truth, soul, and God.
As Nietzsche would recount,

tion

this critique of the fundamental axioms of tradi

might well entail unsuspected consequences of dramatic proportions:

This long plenitude and sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm
that is now impending-who could guess enough of it today to be compelled to
play the teacher and advance proclaimer of this monstrous logic of terror, the
prophet of a gloom and an eclipse of the sun whose like has probably never yet
occurred on earth ?76

This work of critique or destruction, of course, is not merely the product of
one thinker. Against the commanding edifice of metaphysics, we recal l, "every
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sort of spirit which perforates, digs, gnaws, and moulders had to assist in the
work of destruction. "
We must also remember that this kind o f critical "destruction," or "decon
struction," is not merely negative: its results are positive, that is, it rids us of
two millennia of withered pieties, of sanctimonious shrouds. Its intentions are
also positive-they are not motivated by the desire to avoid pain, to seek peace
and repose in the anesthetic balm of religion, or in the smug confidence and
arrogance of a self-consistent logic. Rather, the motivation to destroy comes
about as a gift of fullness, an expression of overflowing power that wills to
create, to quicken the pace, to invoke the future-as a further contest to create
and to affirm a newly understood human order. 77
Oddly enough, the kind of nature that Nietzsche affirms is remarkably simi
lar to an ancient, archaic Greek conception, the pre-Homeric understanding,
in which nature was symbolized by the two-headed

ax

of fertility: nature de

stroys, lays waste, but also harvests. The fields are made to lie fallow such that
they may in tum nurture and produce. The reaper makes way for the new
crop, the new generation. To affirm such a nature is to do so totally and unre
servedly, to affirm its often unpleasant consequences for us, but also to commit
ourselves to its splendor, to will that our human destinies be one with nature
with no escape, no flight from nature so conceived.
Nietzsche views the affirmation of nature, of natural existence (i.e., an en
tirely de-deified nature, wholly amoral, without any transcending purpose, di
rection, or end: an "innocent" nature) as nothing less than the prospect of an
entirely new and different destiny for the whole of mankind-a destiny that is
at once terrifying and rich with the prospect of an infinite future. Here is a
future with no possibility of transcending nature, no possibility of any human
reality other than that of the natural order itself. Nietzsche expresses this con
cept of naturalization by the

image

or

metaphor of what he

calls the "eternal

return," an image that is both terrifying and liberating to the extent that it

irifinitizes humanity and makes it aware of its newly found infinitizing destiny:
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you-into your loneliest
loneliness and say to you, "This life
have to live once more and

as

you now live it and have lived it, you will

innumerable times

more; and there will be nothing

new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same
succession and sequence--even this spider and this moonlight between the trees,
and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned
upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust."
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Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and
demon who spoke thus? Or have you

once

curse

the

experienced a tremendous moment

when you would have answered him, "You are a

God, and never have I heard
divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would change
you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing, "Do
you desire this, once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your
actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become
to yourself and to life [so as] to crave nothing nwre fervently than this ultimate,
anything more

eternal, confirmation and seal?78

appears to be another evangelical
invocation. It reawakens the call of Cusanos with astonishing psychological
force. In effect, it demands the conditional: it asks us, "What if?" This is an
appeal to our resoluteness and steadfastness, perhaps. But it also asks us to be
ratified in the eternal cycle.79 Not only would our lives be repeated to infinity,
This first statement of the eternal return

therefore, but the very cycle of past and future-from antediluvian eons to the
final cataclysm-would be ceaselessly, interminably, relived. But second, and
more importantly, if we grant the finite and open economics of this natural
order, we also grant the untold myriad permutations this finite order, this finite
system, could endure, and our present dust-speck existence would be taken as
one micro-instant of one set of atomic arrangements. This would be a system
of crypto-incarnations, of insemination and dissemination of our own subparti
culate matter. Like Leibniz's celebrated little monads, we would reflect a uni
verse at all times, we would literally inhabit an infinitude of worlds. We would
fi nd our homes deep under the waves that careen and s mas h he adl o ng into

Portofino's cliffs-and we would indeed know their secret.
Would not the fear of a vengeful God and the guilt-inspiring reprobation
from a host of priests disappear like a sweet aftertaste in the light of such a
conception, to be buried---only to rise once again-and yet again pass away,
disposed, metamorphosed by another wrinkle or fold in the crystalline vaults?
Not only would this eternal return be an incentive, a psychological affirma
tion to strengthen our human resolve, but it would itself be the highest expres
sion of the will to

live.

It-the eternal return itself-would be the grandest,

the most complete and total expression of the will

to power.80 Its very concep

tion would bring us to humanity and history. Here, it is not so much a question
of projecting ourselves onto the world from without, as if we, once again, were
claiming hegemony over it. Rather, it is quite the reverse; it would rather be as
if nature, world, history, and humanity
included-introjected-into

our history,

became us, became transformed and
as if they constituted precisely what
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are! All this unfolds itself through us. We would become the heirs and

possessors of this titanic dance, which would be the blood that courses through
our veins to the Dionysian strains of this Joyful Wisdom. This Gay Science,
which replaces the traditional doctrines of transcendence and fearful dependence with a teaching of total immanence and a newfound autonomy, would
infuse us, humanity, with a transfigured vitality, an entirely new kind of emo
tion and feeling, one that would enable us to identify with, and thus celebrate,
the entirety of natural existence:
This is actually one aspect of this new feeling: Anyone who manages to experi
ence the history of humanity as his own

history, will feel in an enormously gener

alized way all the grief of an invalid who thinks of health, of an old man who
thinks of the dreams of his youth, of a lover deprived of his beloved, of the martyr
whose ideal is perishing, of the hero on the evening after a battle that has decided
nothing but brought him wounds and the loss of his friend. But if one endured,
if one

could

endure this immense sum of grief of all kinds while yet being the

hero, who as the second day of battle breaks, welcomes the dawn and his fortune,
being a person whose horizon encompasses thousands of years past and future,
being the heir of all the nobility of all past spirit-an heir with a sense of obliga
tion, the most aristocratic of old nobles and at the same time the first of a new
nobility-the like of which no age has yet seen or dreamed of; if one could bur

den one's soul with all of this-the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, conquests,
and the victories of humanity; if one could finally contain all this in one soul and
crowd it into a single feeling-this would surely have to result in a happiness that
humanity has not known so far: the happiness of a god full of power and love,
full of tears and laughter, a happiness that, like the sun in the evening continually
bestows its inexhaustible riches, pouring them into the sea, feeling richest, as the
sun does, only when even the poorest fisherman is still rowing with golden oars!
This godlike feeling would then be called-humaneness.81

What, then, is this cosmic vitality that eternally repeats itself-that eternally
recurs, and us with it and through it? What is this "will to power"? The will to
power is the will to live, the pulsions of instinct and impulse, the continually
transforming and transfiguring energy of excess and superabundance that con
stitutes the whole of organic and inorganic existence. Seen in this way, life
vitality itself-is not mere endurance, it is not merely a question of some will
to persist, to strive for mere continuation, to hope to bear the next moment, to
sustain the next fetid breath. Rather, it is to create, to. build, to wreak havoc
doing so, possibly, but to augment and ever increase itself, out of force, youth,
energy, and will-to assemble and build, to ingest, and to overcome

again, out

·
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of surfeit, abundance, and health. As Nietzsche expressed this dynamic and
affirmative conception of life:
The wish t o preseive oneself is the symptom o f a condition o f distress, o f a limita
tion of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at

power

and, wishing for that,

frequently risks and even

the expansion of
sacrifices self

preseivation. . . . But a natural scientist should come out of his human nook;
and in nature it is not conditions of distress that are

dominant but overflow and

squandering, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an

exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life. The great and small struggle
always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around
power-in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life.82

To embrace nature and history under the image (i.e., the metaphor or myth)
of the "eternal return," therefore, is to identify one's very being with the "will
to power." In the absence of the infinite God, we become the infinite creators
of an infinitizing future. For Nietzsche, this is at once our natural inheritance
and our historical imperative.
Each moment heralds an infinite future.
Each moment recurs-again and again-in an eternal festival of transience.
Being is thereby stamped as becoming.
Each moment is thus a contraction of the infinite past into a discrete now,
which augurs an unheard of destiny.
And it is the now, this now that must be lived and filled up, complete, re
plete, with life-in order that there be a subsequent now.
All this happens each and every moment.

